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Argument
I.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A.

The district court abused its discretion to deny Carter's request to amend
his post-conviction petition because it failed to articulate any reasons why
the interests of justice did not counsel in favor of amending the petition.

Carter has asked the Court to remand this case to the district court with instructions
to permit current counsel to "rebrief the issues, amend the petition if need be? and to be
allowed access to the prosecutor's files in this case." Appellant's Brief at 32. Appellee
responds that the Court should not do this because there was no likelihood of a more
favorable result for Carter if the district court had taken Carter up on his offer. Appellee's
Brief at 29 (citing State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^ 8, 116 P.3d 360). Appellee then includes
a protracted discussion of what it sees as the nature and extent of the delay in this case as its
primary explanation as to why there was not a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result to Carter. See Appellee's Brief at 9-40. Appellee's arguments fails to address the
standard of review that it says should apply to Carter's argument. In fact, if the district court
had permitted Carter to rebrief the issues in his petition with an eye toward consolidating the
claims and withdrawing previously litigated claims {see ROA 3609 at 23), it is reasonably
likely that the district court would have reviewed more of Carter' s claims on the merits. That
result would have been more favorable to Carter.
As an initial matter, Appellee has not identified the proper standard of review to
govern Carter's request. Appellee points to two cases—State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, 116
P.3d 360, and State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993)—in which the lower court
1
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denied a continuance of a trial in a criminal case. See Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^ 7; Cabututan,
861 P.2d at 413. Appellee also relies on the fact that this case is a civil case to argue against
Carter's request. See Appellee's Brief at 37 (citing Maxwell v. Turner, 435 P.2d 287, 288
(Utah 1967) ("Proceedings in habeas corpus are generally regarded as being civil in nature

.

and consequently follow the same rules of procedure as in other civil actions.")); but
compare Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ^ 11 n.l, 123 P.3d 400 ("We note that . . . postconviction relief is sought in a civil proceeding

") (citing Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249,

250 n.l (Utah 1998)), with Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, f 10 n.l, 197 P.3d 650
("Although capital cases, including post-conviction proceedings, are clearly criminal in

{

nature . . . ."). If Appellee is correct that this case is a civil case, then Carter's request to
rebrief and amend is governed by Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
i

corresponding standard of review rather than the standard set forth in Cabututan and Taylor.
Under Rule 15, leave to amend or supplement pleadings should be given when justice
so requires. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) (leave to amend); 15(d) (leave to supplement). And
"when a district court does not provide any reasons for denying leave to amend, the denial
is a per se abuse of discretion" unless the district court's reasoning is apparent from the
record. Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ^f 19,243 P.3d 1275 (citingFoman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Appellee asserts that the district court "effectively denied"
Carter's request "when, nearly three months later, it granted the motion to dismiss."
Appellee's Brief at 28. Thus Appellee has conceded that the district court implicitly denied
Carter's request without explanation—a per se abuse of discretion under Hudgens unless the
2
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(

reason for the denial is apparent from the record. Nothing in Appellee's brief explains why
the reason for denying the request is apparent from the record. And indeed the reason is not
apparent from the record. Thus the district court abused its discretion when it denied Carter's
request to rebrief and amend his petition without explaining why justice did not require the
district court to permit him to do so. See Hudgens, 2010 UT 68, ^ 21 (holding that a district
court abused its discretion to deny a request to amend when it simply "cite[d] the arguments
set forth in the briefs and oral arguments as support for its decision").
Carter reminds the Court that from the very beginning this case has been riddled with
ineffective assistance of counsel, appointment of counsel who labored under conflicts of
interest, and extrinsic limitations on the resources available to counsel. This Court should
not allow the death sentence to be carried out in this case without first ensuring that
competent counsel have facilitated an adequate review of the conviction and sentence. See
Archuleta, 2008 UT 76,118. In order to provide that assistance, this Court should vacate
the district court's order granting the State's motion to dismiss and remand for any and all
further proceedings necessary to assure this Court that Carter has been afforded the necessary
due process to ensure that the death sentence is meted and carried out fairly.
B.

With respect to the claims in Group 1, the district court's failure to apply
the common-law exceptions to the procedural bar was unwarranted.

Focusing primarily on what it sees as Carter's failure to preserve the arguments before
the district court, Appellee asks the Court to affirm the district court's application of the
procedural bar to the claims that the district court ruled were raised and rejected in prior

3
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proceedings (Group 1). Carter specifically asked the district court to apply any or all of the
common-law exceptions to the procedural bar, thereby preserving that specific obj ection for
appellate review. Moreover, the district court specifically addressed Carter's contention,
because it ruled that no common-law exception to the procedural bar applied to the claims

.

in Group 1. Finally, Appellee's remaining arguments lack merit. The district court erred in
denying relief.
1.

Carter adequately preserved his contentions that the district court
should have excused the procedural bar because unusual
circumstances and fundamental fairness warranted merits review.

Appellee's primary defense of the district court's treatment of the claims in Group 1

|

is that Carter did not adequately argue before the district court in favor of applying the
unusual-circumstances and fundamental-fairness exceptions to the procedural bar. See
Appellee's Brief at 56. It complains that Carter "included only a general discussion of the
common law exceptions" but did not "identify which, if any, he believed applied to his case
or present any analysis why any common law exception excused his default," Appellee's
Brief at 56. Thus Appellee contends that this Court should review for plain error the district
court's decisions regarding the unusual-circumstances and fundamental-fairness exceptions
to the procedural bar.
In support of its argument for plain-error review, Appellee points out that this Court
requires a "specific objection" made to the lower court in order to preserve an argument for
appeal. Appellee's Brief at 56 (citing State v. Low, 2008 UT 56,117, 192 P.3d 867; State
v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ^ 16,122 P.3d 556). Carter did make a specific objection sufficient
4
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j

to preserve his arguments for appeal. The rules of civil procedure permitted Carter to argue
in the alternative for application of all of the common-law exceptions to the procedural bar.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (permitting arguments in the alternative). In a section headed
"Relevant Law Regarding Claims Raised in Successive Petitions" (ROA 523), Carter
expressly directed the district court to the five common-law "unusual circumstances"
exceptions set forth in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). (ROA 522-521.) He said
that these exceptions "retain their independent constitutional significance and may be
examined by a court in its review of post-conviction petitions." (ROA 521 (citing Tillman
v. State, 2005 UT 56,1f 22, 128 P.3d 1123).) Moreover, the district court understood that
Carter had asked it to apply all of the Hurst exceptions, because it expressly held that those
exceptions were not available to Carter. (ROA 3500.) Because Carter may argue in the
alternative for application of each of the five Hurst exceptions to the procedural bar, and
specifically directed the district court to apply all of them, he has satisfied the specificobjection requirement.
Carter's presentation to the district court stands in sharp contrast to the presentation
in both State v. Low, 2008 UT 76 and State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, the two cases on which
Appellee relies to support its plain-error contention. Both of these cases are distinguishable
on their facts. The touchstone of the specific-objection requirement is that the appellant
present to the district court the same grounds for reversal that he presents in his Opening
Brief. See Low, 2008 UT 58, f 18. In Low the appellant did not do that, and the court
accordingly reviewed only for plain error. See id. at If 19. Here by contrast Carter made all
5
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I
the available alternative arguments by arguing for application of all of the Hurst exceptions.
No plain-error review applies. Cf. id. at | 17 (making one objection does not preserve

i

alternative objections). And in Weaver the appellant conceded that he did not make the
required objection in the lower court. See 2005 UT 49, *[} 17. Not only has Carter not made

i

a similar concession, but he also has specifically identified the places in the record where he
presented the arguments he now makes on appeal to the district court. This Court should
therefore apply the ordinary standard of review—review for correctness. See Parsons v.

i

Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994).
2.

Fundamental fairness requires a post-conviction court to review
the merits of claims relating to a petitioner's potential innocence.

<

Appellee next contends that the fundamental-fairness exception to the procedural bar
does not apply to claims of innocence. Appellee's Brief at 59-60. This contention lacks

(

support in this Court's case law.
The common-law exceptions to the procedural bar are rooted in the need to "assure
fundamental fairness" and "assure that substantial justice was done." Hurst, 111 P.2d at
1035 (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)). The common-law exceptions must be applied, this Court has said, in the face
of an "obvious injustice." Id. And no injustice is more obvious than the imprisonment of
an innocent person.
Nevertheless, Appellee suggests that even concerns of fundamental fairness cannot
require a post-conviction court to revisit a petitioner's previously-rejected claim. It points

6
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out that in Carter III this Court said that issues "raised and disposed of on direct appeal"
must be "dismissed as an abuse of the writ, without a ruling on the merits." Appellee's Brief
at 58-59, quoting 2001 UT 96, | 6 (citing Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah
1994)). The court in Carter III did not overrule the fundamental-fairness exceptions to the
procedural bar, and this Court has subsequently confirmed that those exceptions continue to
have force. See, e.g., Tillman, 2005 UT 56,fflj20-22. Furthermore, the fact that federal law
might impose a more stringent standard for excusing a procedural default in the face of a
petitioner's claim of innocence, see Appellee's Brief at 60 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298 (1995), is irrelevant. Whether a Utah state court may examine the merits of a postconviction claim can be resolved solely by resort to Utah state law. See Tillman, 2005 UT
56, 1| 19; see also Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 878 (Utah 1990) ("In our view, it is
appropriate that federal habeas review be more difficult to obtain than state habeas review.")
This Court should therefore not accept Appellee's suggestion that a post-conviction court can
never revisit a previously-rejected claim in the face of a petitioner's assertion of innocence.
C.

The district court did not correctly apply the procedural bar to the claims
in Group 2 because it did not properly consider either whether the claims
had been overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the
post-conviction process or whether ineffective assistance of prior counsel
excused the procedural bar.

The district court placed in Group 2 all claims that in its view could have been but
were not raised in a prior proceeding. Carter asked the district court to review the merits of
these claims because of ineffective assistance of prior counsel. That ineffective assistance
meant that the claims had been overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the
7
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post-conviction process. Accordingly, the district court should have considered whether the
ineffective assistance justified lifting the procedural bar and reaching the merits of Carter's

'

claims. The district court abdicated its constitutional responsibility to engage in Carter's
request for merits review. Accordingly, this Court should either conduct the merits review
in the first instance or remand to the district court for further proceedings.
1.

Carter specifically asked the district court to excuse the procedural
bar on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, so plain-error
review does not apply.

*

Just as it did with respect to the claims in Group 1, Appellee argues that the Court
should review for plain error the district court's application of the procedural bar to the

<

claims in Group 2 because he did not specifically ask the district court to lift the procedural
bar based on the common-law exceptions, Appellee's Brief at 56, or on a violation of the
(

right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Appellee's Brief at 64. Appellee is
wrong on both counts. As Carter has previously explained with respect to the claims in
Group 1, he did specifically ask the district court to apply all of the common-law exceptions
to the procedural bar. Thus he satisfied the specific-objection requirement of the two cases
on which Appellee relies in support of plain-error review. See Low, 2008 UT 56, ^ 17;
Weaver, 2005 UT 49, If 16.
With respect to the claims in Group 2, Carter also asked the district court to take into
account the ineffective assistance of counsel he received at "every stage," which resulted in
"no court. . . ever [being] presented with the full, detailed facts surrounding Mr. Carter's
ineffective representation by trial, sentencing, appellate, and post-conviction counsel."
8
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{

(ROA 519.) In conjunction with this assertion Carter cited Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873
(Utah 1990), in which the court held that ineffective assistance of counsel was an unusual
circumstance that justified lifting the procedural bar. (ROA 519.) Thus, when Carter asked
the district court to review his claims on the merits, notwithstanding any procedural bar, he
specifically asked the court to consider all possible unusual circumstances for doing so,
including the ineffective assistance of prior counsel. Because he specifically asked the
district court to excuse the procedural bar both on grounds of Hurst unusual circumstances
and on grounds of ineffective assistance of prior counsel, Carter's arguments relating to the
procedural bar imposed by the district court with respect to Group 2 are preserved for appeal.
The Court should therefore proceed to review the district court's ruling for correctness. See
Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518.
2.

In light of the district court's assumptions about the strength of the
claims in Group 2, Appellee has failed to adequately explain how
the district court correctly applied the threshold facial-plausibility
inquiry to those claims.

Carter and Appellee agree that a threshold inquiry into reasons for summarily denying
the claims in Group 2 must precede any application of the common-law exceptions to the
procedural bar. Appellee overlooks the fact that the district court engaged in two crucial
assumptions that prevented it from correctly applying the threshold plausibility inquiry to the
claims in Group 2. In view of these assumptions, the district court did not correctly apply
the procedural bar. This Court should therefore either apply the procedural bar correctly or
remand to the district court for it to do so in the first instance.

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Before a court applies the common-law exceptions to the procedural bar, it must first
make a threshold determination regarding whether the claims at issue are appropriate for

'

summary dismissal. See Gardner v. Galetka {Gardner II), 2007 UT 3,fflf21-22, 151 P.3d
968. Claims that are appropriate for summary dismissal at the threshold stage include claims

.

that are frivolous, claims that were previously litigated and are not accompanied by an
explanation why unusual circumstances or good cause exist to justify reexamining those
claims, and claims that were withheld for tactical reasons. See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037.
Only if the claims in Group 2 survive the threshold summary-dismissal inquiry should a court
then proceed to apply the Hurst good-cause exceptions. See Gardner II, 2007 UT 3, ^ 24.

{

Carter demonstrated that the claims in Group 2 should survive the threshold summarydismissal inquiry. First, the district court expressly assumed that the claims were not
{

frivolous in nature. (ROA 3493.) Second, the claims in Group 2 had not been previously
litigated, so the district court could not summarily dismiss the claims on the ground that they
were "once-litigated claims with no showing of 'unusual circumstances' or 'good cause."'
Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037. And third, Carter argued that prior counsel were ineffective in
failing to raise the claims in Group 2, meaning that counsel lacked any tactical reason for
failing to raise the claim. The district court engaged in unwarranted speculation on this
point, and Appellee has not adequately defended the district court's speculation.
The district court summarily dismissed the claims in Group 2 because it concluded
that it was "certainly plausible" in light of "all the circumstances of the case and the
limitations in terms of time, funding, and resources" that prior counsel omitted the claims in
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

Group 2 because they were "weaker or less persuasive than the other claims that were
raised." (ROA 3493.) By asserting that prior counsel were ineffective, Carter implicitly
contended that prior counsel lacked any valid tactical basis for failing to raise the claims in
Group 2, even if the limitations on prior counsel's time and resources were taken into
account. In his memorandum opposing Appellee's motion to dismiss, Carter contended that
prior counsel were ineffective because they raised claims in a "generic and unsupported
fashion" without adducing "specific, documentary evidence" to support the claims they did
raise. (ROA 519.) This assertion suggested that the failure to raise the claims in Group 2
was not the product of a professional judgment that was reasonable under the circumstances
counsel actually faced when preparing the prior post-conviction petition. Cf. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,691 (1984) (counsel is ineffective if their actions are the product
of strategic judgments that are unreasonable in light of all the circumstances surrounding the
representation). When it asserted that it was "certainly plausible" for prior counsel to fail to
raise the claims, the district court improperly relied on hindsight and speculation to excuse
what may not have been a tactical decision on the part of prior counsel. See id. at 689 ("A
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."). The threshold
inquiry into counsel's tactical reasons for overlooking a claim contemplated by Hurst cannot
be satisfied by mere speculation.

11
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Simply put, nothing in Appellee's brief supports the district court's speculation in any
way—that there exist unspecified tactical reasons for failing to raise the claims in Group 2

'

in prior proceedings. Carter asserted that the claims should be reviewed on the merits on
account of prior counsel's ineffective assistance. If prior counsel did render ineffective

i

assistance, then under Strickland and Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, they
must have lacked a tactical reason for failing to include the claims in prior proceedings. The
district court did not examine this aspect of Carter's arguments. Accordingly, this Court
should either consider that argument in the first instance or remand to the district court for
it to do so.

{
3.

There is nothing controversial about creating a new common-law
exception to the procedural bar to correspond with the right this
Court created in Menzies v. Galetka.
i

Appellee defends the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the claims in
Group 2 by arguing against relying on the right to effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel to overcome summary dismissal. Appellee has failed to explain why prior counsel's

{

ineffectiveness both justifies summary dismissal and does not constitute good cause under
Hurst for reaching the merits of the claims in Group 2.
Appellee acknowledges that in Menzies this Court "created a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel analogous to the Sixth and Fourteenth
i

Amendment rights that apply to the criminal trial and direct appeal." Appellee's Brief at 43.
Because the court in Menzies expressly adopted the federal constitutional framework for
assessing the effectiveness of post-conviction counsel, see Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^ 85-86,
12
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Carter now contends that the Court should recognize a common-law exception to the
procedural bar for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See Opening Brief at
95-104. Appellee disagrees, alternatively arguing that this Court should now overrule
Menzies and that the legislature overruled Menzies when it amended the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act in 2008. Neither of Appellee's rejoinders is persuasive. In effect, Appellee
is arguing that Menzies created a right without a remedy.
a.

Appellee has offered no persuasive reason for overruling
Menzies at this time.

Appellee contends that this Court should overrule Menzies for three reasons. First,
it argues that the Menzies court's interpretation of Utah Code § 78-35a-202 (now recodified
and amended at Utah Code § 78B-9-202) "exceeds what the Legislature plainly provided
for." Appellee's Brief at 53 (citing Carter v. Univ. of Utah Medical Or., 2006 UT 78,1j 9,
150 P.3d 467). Second, it argues that the Menzies interpretation "exceeds section 202's
purpose." Appellee's Brief at 53 (citing Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, *{ 12, 223 P.3d
1128). Third, Appellee argues that "the Menzies interpretation has led to a result... so
absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature." Appellee's Brief at 54
(quoting Berneau, 2009 UT 87, ][ 12). This appeal is not a vehicle for Appellee to rehash
arguments that did not persuade the court nearly five years ago in Menzies. Rather, in order
to see this Court reverse its holding in Menzies, Appellee must make arguments aimed at
justifying a reversal of settled expectations that have arisen in the face of that decision. See
State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53,fflf59-60 (Lee, J., concurring). This Appellee has failed to do.
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I
In order to succeed in its effort to see Menzies overruled, Appellee must satisfy a
"substantial burden of persuasion" that the Menzies decision was "clearly erroneous or [that]
conditions have changed so as to render" the decision inapplicable. Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT
38,126, 212 P.3d 547 (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 & n.3 (Utah 1994)).

i

Appellee points to three other pending appeals in which the Appellant relies on Menzies as
a basis for reversing the lower court. See Appellee's Brief at 55. Pointing to other appeals
in which death-row prisoners are relying on Menzies does not help Appellee to show either
that Menzies was clearly erroneous or that conditions have changed such that Menzies is
unworkable. Finally, Appellee asserts that the legislature created a statutory right to counsel

{

in capital post-conviction cases because it wanted to satisfy the standards set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2261 for obtaining truncated federal habeas review in capital cases. Appellee's
i

Brief at 53-54. The legislature's desire to see truncated federal review in death penalty cases
does not help to explain why affording capital post-conviction petitioners a right to effective
assistance of counsel is either unworkable or clearly wrong. Because Appellee has not

{

explained why the holding in Menzies is either unworkable or clearly erroneous, this Court
should not overrule Menzies.
I

b.

The amendment to section 202 that was enacted after Carter
filed his petition does not apply to Carter's case.

In 2008 the legislature amended section 202 by adding a new subsection (4):
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating the right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that post-conviction
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(

counsel was ineffective." Appellee contends that this amendment applies to Carter's case
because it is procedural and not substantive. Appellee's Brief at 46-53. Even assuming (as
Appellee suggests) that new subsection (4) was intended to overrule Menzies, see Appellee's
Brief at 48, new subsection (4) does not apply retroactively to Carter's case.
Subject to three important exceptions, the general rule is that an appellate court will
apply the version of a statute in effect at the time of the events giving rise to a suit. See Salt
Lake County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, U 41, 234 P.3d 1105 (quoting Taghipour
v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, % 5 n. 1, 52 P.3d 1252). Carter filed the post-conviction petition under
review here in 2006, before the legislature added subsection (4) to section 202. Under the
2006 version of section 202, Carter enjoyed a right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel, as Menzies confirmed. See, e.g., Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
740 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987) ("As a general proposition, a judicial interpretation of a
statute becomes a gloss on that statute that is, in effect, part of the statute."). So unless any
of the three exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactive application of statutory
amendments applies to new subsection (4), then the right recognized in Menzies applies to
Carter's case.
The first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity is an express declaration
from the legislature that a statutory amendment applies retroactively. See Holliday Water,
2010 UT 45, 1 41 (citing Utah Code § 68-3-3). Nothing in the bill passed by the legislature
that amended section 202 indicates that the amendment should apply retroactively. See S.B.
277,57th Leg, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008). The fact that new subsection (4) is a "response
15
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to Menzies" is beside the point. Appellee's Brief at 52. Thus the first exception does not
i

apply.
The second exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity is if the amendment
"merely clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment." Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, ^j 41

.

(quoting Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982)). Here
Appellee contends that adding subsection (4) to section 202 "merely clarifie[d] the
I
Legislature's original intent when it provided for state-funded post-conviction counsel in
death penalty cases." Appellee's Brief at 50. This is so, Appellee says, because nothing in
the original section 202 dictated any "performance standards" for appointed counsel in

{

capital post-conviction cases. Appellee's Brief at 50. Thus, Appellee says, new subsection
(4) "merely expresses the original legislative intent" to ensure that Utah qualifies for the
truncated federal habeas review provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2261-2266. Appellee's
Brief at 50-51.
(

There is no empirical support for Appellee's argument that new subsection (4) merely
clarifies that the legislature originally intended for section 202 to help Utah qualify for
truncated federal habeas review in capital cases. Indeed, as Appellee acknowledges,
"Congress did not condition [truncated federal review] on a state establishing performance
standards for post-conviction counsel." Appellee's Brief at 51. All that Congress required
i

of states seeking to qualify for truncated federal habeas review in capital cases is that the
states establish a mechanism for the "appointment, compensation, and payment ofreasonable
litigation expenses of competent counsel" in capital post-conviction cases brought by state
16
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prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(1)(A). That is what the original section 202 did, and nothing
about new subsection (4) serves to clarify the effect of the original section 202.
Appellee's acknowledgment regarding what Congress required of the states in order
to qualify for truncated federal review should defeat its argument that new subsection (4)
applies retroactively because it is a clarifying amendment. New subsection (4) addresses the
relief available on account of deficient performance of post-conviction counsel, not a lack
of competence on counsel's part. Indeed, as the court in Menzies recognized, counsel
appointed to represent a death-row prisoner in post-conviction proceedings can be competent
and nevertheless render substandard representation. See 2006 UT 81, ^f 83 & n. 11. Because
competence of counsel and performance of counsel are distinct, new subsection (4) and its
focus on the relief available for counsel's deficient performance cannot have expressed any
clarification about how the original section 202 embodied the legislature's desire to qualify
Utah for truncated federal review. New subsection (4) was not a clarifying amendment. See
Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, U 45 (quoting Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6,
8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Thus the second exception does not apply.
The third exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity for statutory amendments
applies to amendments that are "purely procedural" and "do[] not affect the substantive rights
of the parties." Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, If 41 (citing Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010
UT 12,114,227 P.3d 256). Appellee thus contends that new subsection (4) is a procedural
and not a substantive amendment to the statute. Appellee's Brief at 47-49. One indication
that an amendment is substantive is that it bestows a right that did not previously exist. See
17
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Holliday Water, 2010 UT 45, \ 45 (citing Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996)). That is exactly what the Menzies decision did. Before Menzies there was no

'

right to the effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction cases. See Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). Menzies imparted that right, as Appellee concedes.
See Appellee's Brief at 43. That concession should end the discussion. New subsection (4)
is thus substantive, not procedural, and does not apply retroactively.
In sum, Menzies created a substantive right to effective assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings. New subsection (4), which was enacted after Carter filed his
petition in the district court, took that right away. The legislature never expressly said that

\

new subsection (4) applies retroactively. New subsection (4) does far more than merely
clarify the legislature's goal in enacting section 202. And the right that new subsection (4)
took away is plainly substantive. Therefore new subsection (4), which took away the right
created in Menzies, does not apply retroactively to Carter's petition.1
c.

Because Menzies applies to Carter's petition, the district
court erred when it held that no common-law exception to
the procedural bar exists for violations of the right
recognized in that case.

<

Now that Carter has shown that there is no valid reason to overrule Menzies and that

'

a subsequent legislative amendment did not take the right recognized in Menzies away from

*In addition, this Court could apply Menzies in such a way so as not to grant relief on
an independent claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. This Court could
simply use Menzies as a reason for giving Carter merits review of his underlying claims, or
as a reason to allow current counsel time to re-brief the issues and claims.
18
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Carter, he can address the district court's failure to create an exception to the common-law
procedural bar in the face of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Carter argues
that the district court erroneously concluded that the legislature intended to foreclose an
exception to the procedural bar based on ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
and had no valid reason for abdicating its constitutional responsibility for determining
whether a common-law exception should exist. Opening Brief at 101-104. Appellee
disagrees. Appellee's Brief at 44-46. Appellee's arguments are just as erroneous as the
district court's reasoning.
Any explanation of why Appellee and the district court are wrong must begin with the
text of the statutory procedural bar. See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm >z, 2011
UT 28, \ 21, 254 P.3d 752 (citing R&R Indus. Park LLC v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar.
Ass % 2008 UT 80, \ 23, 199 P.3d 917). The statutory procedural bar may be lifted "if the
failure to raise" a particular claim in prior proceedings "was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel." Utah Code § 78B-9-106(3). If the legislature had meant to limit this exception
solely to situations of constitutional ineffectiveness, it would have said so. It did not. Thus
under the text of section 106(3), any ineffective assistance of counsel—no matter the source
of the right to effective assistance, see Menzies, 2006 UT 81, \ 84 (right to effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel is statutory)—serves as a reason to lift the statutory
procedural bar. Appellee's contrary assertion—that the "ineffective assistance exception in
[section] 106(3) expressly applies" only to claims that "could have been but [were] not raised
at trial or on direct appeal"—therefore lacks support in the text of section 106(3). See
19
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Appellee's Brief at 44. Even though nothing in the text of section 106(3) precludes excusing
the statutory procedural bar in the face of a violation of the statutory right to effective

'

assistance of counsel, Appellee nevertheless contends that excusing the procedural bar in the
face of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel would "conflict [] with Menzies" by
"permitting the infinite litigation that the Menzies Court said section 106 would prevent."
Appellee's Brief at 45. To be sure, the courts may take steps to "prevent abuse by prisoners
who burden the courts and frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep a case alive
indefinitely." Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036. Finality in criminal cases is not the paramount goal
of Utah's post-conviction review process. "As important as finality is, it does not have a

(

higher value than the constitutional guarantees of liberty." Id. at 1035. After all, the "law
should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the victim should
be without remedy." Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). Accordingly, even
if the statutory procedural bar does not furnish a vehicle for obtaining merits review in a
successive post-conviction action in the face of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel (as Appellee argues), then the common law must. See Gardner v. Galetka {Gardner
I), 2004 UT 42,115,94 P.3d 263. Appellee's appeal to the goal of finality is not a sufficient
reason to avoid creating a common-law exception to the procedural bar here.
For the past 32 years this Court has held that a "fundamental unfairness in a
conviction" that "raises a fair question as to whether a new trial should be granted" justifies
excusing a procedural bar and examining the merits of a post-conviction claim. Hurst, 111
P.2d at 1037 & n.10. Ineffective assistance of counsel may give rise to such an unfairness.
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

See Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990); Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989).
Where a capital post-conviction petitioner loses his opportunity to "investigate his claims and
present them to the district court for resolution" because of the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, fundamental fairness dictates that he be given a second opportunity to
do so with the proper assistance of counsel. See Menzies, 2006 UT 81,1110. Allowing him
to do so helps to ensure that a death sentence is not carried out in the face of egregious
violations of the prisoner's constitutional rights. See Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, ^f
19, 197 P.3d 650. This Court should therefore rule that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in violation of the right recognized in Menzies is an unusual circumstance
that supports lifting the procedural bar in accordance with the common law.
4.

The district court unconstitutionally applied a statute of limitations
to the claims in Group 3 and incorrectly ruled that the claims in
that group were meritless because they were procedurally barred.

All of the claims in Group 3 rest on the right recognized in Menzies to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel. {See ROA 3492.) The district court ruled that the
procedural bar does not apply to these claims because they plainly could not have been raised
in prior proceedings. (ROA 3491.) The district court also concluded that these claims were
not timely filed because Carter filed his petition nearly eight years after July 1,1997, the date
on which the statute of limitations ran. (ROA 3501.) After concluding that the interests-ofjustice exception, see generally Adams, 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400, was available to Carter
(ROA 3524), the district court ruled that none of the claims in Group 3 qualified for the
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exception because "all of the underlying issues upon which" the claims in Group 3 "rely are
procedurally barred, both now and in the future." (ROA 3491.)
Carter presented two challenges to these rulings. First, Carter contended that the
district court had to review all of the claims in Group 3 on the merits because the statute of

.

limitations could not constitutionally be applied to those claims. Applying the statute of
limitations to the claims in Group 3 is unconstitutional, Carter contends, because the statute
I
does not provide for timely raising claims based on retroactively applicable new rules of law
such as Menzies. Opening Brief at 123-127. Second, Carter contends that the claims in
Group 3 are claims upon which relief may be granted because the underlying claims would

{

not have been procedurally barred in the first post-conviction proceeding. Opening Brief at
128-129. In addition, Carter also argued that the claims were sufficiently meritorious to
warrant relief notwithstanding any limitation period. Opening Brief at 129-132.
Appellee does not directly address Carter's challenges. Instead, Appellee argues that
Carter "invited" the district court to make the rulings it made because he failed to raise his
arguments regarding the unconstitutional application of the statute of limitations. Appellee's
Brief at 70-71. Appellee also broadly argues that the Adams interests-of-justice exception
does not apply to Carter's case. Appellee's Brief at 72-76. Appellee's arguments miss the
mark. Under Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998), this Court must remand this case
for further proceedings.
5.

Carter's arguments regarding the district court's application of a
statute of limitations to screen out the claims in Group 3 are
preserved for appellate review.
22
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(

In his memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, Carter pointed out that this Court
has twice said that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to foreclose
review of a habeas petition. (ROA 528 (citing Frausto, 966 P.2d at 851; Julian v. State, 966
P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998)). If the district court agreed with that statement, then it would
have had no choice but to review the claims in Group 3 on the merits. Yet the district court
considered the interests-of-justice exception and declined merits review because in its view
the claims in Group 3 did not state a claim for relief. Thus the district court considered and
rejected Carter's request that it not apply the statute of limitations because it would be
unconstitutional to do so. Because Carter argued to the district court that it would be
categorically unconstitutional for it to apply the statute of limitations to the claims in Group
3, he is perfectly free to argue to this Court that it would be unconstitutional to apply the
statute of limitations because the statute does not provide for timely filing of claims based
on retroactively applicable new rules of law. See Yee v. City ofEscondido, 503 U.S. 519,
534 (1992) ("Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in
support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.").
Appellee's arguments for plain-error review {see Appellee's Brief at 71) thus miss the mark.
Likewise, Appellee's arguments for forfeiture based on invited error are inapposite.
See Appellee's Brief at 70. Appellee fails to explain how Carter "led the trial court into
committing the error" that Carter now challenges on appeal. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT
16,19, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996)). Indeed,
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i
the district court did not heed Carter's suggestion at all, for if it had it would have assessed
the claims in Group 3 on the merits, unfettered by the statute of limitations.
In addition to arguing that Carter's constitutional argument is forfeited, Appellee also
contends that this Court has never expressly held that no statute of limitations may

.

constitutionally be applied to entirely foreclose post-conviction review. Carter does not
dispute that in Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400, the court chose to resolve the
appellant's challenges by construing a statute instead of a constitutional provision. See 2005
UT 62, H 9 (citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240,242 (Utah 1980)). The fact that this Court
has in the past chosen to avoid a constitutional question should not prevent Carter from

<

raising one if it is appropriate to do so. No prior case has addressed whether claims based
on newly created and retroactively applicable rights, such as the right recognized in Menzies,
I

should be exempt from the PCRA's statute of limitations as a matter of either statutory
interpretation or constitutional law. Nothing prevented the district court from entertaining
that question. When constitutional questions are squarely presented, nothing prevents this

{

Court from addressing these questions. Appellee has offered no persuasive reason not to
consider whether it would be unconstitutional to use a statute of limitations from foreclosing
l

relief on claims based on Menzies, as Carter contends.
Finally, Appellee has not argued that Carter cannot secure relief in this proceeding for
i

violations of the right recognized in Menzies. Nor has Appellee argued that, consistent with
the suspension clause and open-courts provisions of the Utah Constitution, see Utah Const.
art. I, §§ 5, 11, claims based on Menzies can be foreclosed on account of a statute of
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limitations. Cf. Frausto, 966 P.2d at 850-51. Appellee instead focuses on whether Carter's
claims are timely. See Appellee's Brief at 68. In his Opening Brief Carter did not contest
the district court's conclusion that his petition was filed nearly eight years after July 1,1997.
In sum, Appellee has focused on arguments that Carter did not make and invoked forfeiture
doctrines that do not apply to Carter's case. The Court should, therefore, disregard
Appellee's arguments.
6.

This Court must remand this case for further consideration of the
interests-of-justice exception because the district court did not
correctly consider that exception in the first instance.

Next, Appellee defends the district court's dismissal of the claims in Group 3 on the
ground that the interests of justice did not require the district court to consider their merits.
Appellee's Brief at 72-76. The district court did not correctly apply the interests-of-justice
exception. Under Frausto, this Court must remand the case to the district court for it to do
so in the first instance. Appellee's arguments about how the claims in Group 3 do not qualify
for the interests-of-justice exception are therefore premature.
The district court erred because it did not logically explain why the claims in Group
3 must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
claims in Group 3 relate to the failure of prior post-conviction counsel to raise claims relating
to the trial and appellate phase in Carter's/?™? post-conviction petition. If prior postconviction counsel had raised those claims, they would not have been procedurally barred,
for the first post-conviction proceeding was Carter's first opportunity to raise claims relating
to the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel. Because claims relating to trial and
25
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appellate ineffectiveness would not have been procedurally barred in the first post-conviction
proceedings, claims asserting that prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective for raising
those trial- and appellate-phase claims could not be procedurally barred in this proceeding.
Thus, the district court erred when it concluded that the claims in Group 3 would be barred

.

"now and in the future" (ROA 3491) and found the claims time-barred for that reason.
The district court did not correctly apply the interests-of-justice exception because it
did not correctly conclude that the claims in Group 3 were frivolous. It incorrectly conflated
the claims that should have been raised in the first post-conviction proceeding with the
claims that actually were contained in Group 3. Because the district court dismissed these

{

claims without properly considering whether the interests of justice required it to evaluate
them on the merits, this Court must remand this case for further proceedings. See Frausto,
i

966 P.2d at 851. Appellee has offered no reason for this Court not to follow Frausto in this
case.
D.

Appellee has failed to persuade this Court that in capital cases it lacks the
power to lift either the procedural bar or the limitations bar in the
interest of justice.

Finally, Carter contended that the district court erred by failing to review his claims
on the merits in the interest ofjustice because this is a capital case. Based on its own review
of this Court's prior decisions and its own vision of "sound policy," Appellee's Brief at 41,
Appellee contends that merits review is never available in capital cases to ensure the interests
of justice. Appellee's Brief at 41-42. Appellee cannot deny that this Court in fact has
reviewed the merits of post-conviction claims to ensure that justice is done in capital cases,
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j

and that practice reflects a sounder policy than the truncated review that Appellee advocates.
First, Appellee is incorrect to suggest that plain-error review applies to this contention.
See Appellee's Brief at 42 n.24. As required by the rules of appellate procedure, Carter
provided at the appropriate place in his Opening Brief a "citation to the record showing that
the issue was preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). See Opening Brief
at 4. On pages 11 and 12 of his Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Carter pointed to the "special treatment accorded death
penalty cases" (ROA 519), and particularly now-Chief Justice Durham's statement that the
"mere possibility that the death penalty may have been imposed by mistake" may be
"sufficient... to constitute good cause for review" post-conviction claims on the merits
(ROA 518 (citing Andrews v. Shulsen, 111 P.2d 832, 834 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J.,
dissenting)). Thus Appellee was plainly wrong when it said that "Carter includes no citation
where he asked the district court to" review his claims on the merits notwithstanding any
otherwise-applicable procedural bar because this is a capital case. Appellee's Brief at 42
n.24. This Court should therefore review for correctness whether the district court correctly
declined to apply any common-law exception to the procedural bar that may exist for capital
cases. See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518.
Second, Appellee has failed to explain how this Court's decisional law does not make
room for the possibility of merits review in capital cases to ensure that substantial justice is
done. Instead it asserts that this Court has "long enforced procedural bars against deathsentenced post-conviction petitioners." Appellee's Brief at 41. That assertion overlooks the
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fact that even as this Court has previously denied relief in capital cases based on the
procedural bar, it nevertheless has consistently also allowed for the possibility that merits
review would always be available in capital cases under appropriate circumstances. Appellee
does not dispute that this Court regularly does so when it sits in direct review of a death

.

sentence. See, e.g., State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^j 15, 57 P.3d 977 (citing State v. Lafferty,
2001 UT 19, *h 96, 20 P.3d 342; State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552 (Utah 1987)); State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982)). Nor does Appellee dispute that this Court did so in a
prior appeal in Carter's own case. See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^f 16, 44 P.3d 626
("We have examined the merits of the above-listed claims to determine whether Carter has

<

satisfied the unusual circumstances test."). Further, Appellee has not identified any capital
case decided by this Court in which merits review was not even theoretically available.
i

Nothing inKellv. State, 2008 UT 62,194 P.3d 913, orLafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73,
175 P.3d 530, undermines Carter's contention that merits review should at least theoretically
be available in capital cases when the interests ofjustice require. In both cases the court did
consider basic fairness as a reason for excusing otherwise generally applicable procedural
requirements. See Kell, 2008 UT 62, % 23, 194 P.3d 913 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c));
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, % 47, 175 P.3d 530 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c); Tillman v. State,
2005 UT 56, If 21, 128 P.3d 1123; Gardner II, 2007 UT 3,fflf18-20 & n.31. Likewise in
Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 1988), the court considered whether to lift the
procedural bar in the face of a showing of "good cause," even though the court ultimately
concluded that no good cause existed.
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Nor does last year's decision in Gardner v. State {Gardner IV), 2010 UT 46,234 P.3d
1115, foreclose merits review in capital cases out of a concern for basic fairness. Even as
an amendment to Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure purported to take away this
Court's constitutional prerogative to define the scope of post-conviction review, the Court
suggested that merits review might nevertheless be available in cases of "egregious
injustice." Gardner IV, 2010 UT 46,194,234 P.3d 1115. However egregious the potential
injustice might need to be before merits review is required, the court in Gardner IV simply
held that any injustice there was not egregious enough to warrant merits review. See 2010
UT 46, ^f 97, 234 P.3d 1115. In short, nothing in the four cases Appellee points to in its
brief—Gardner IV, Kell,Lafferty, mdAndrews (see Appellee's Brief at 41)—stands for the
proposition that merits review in capital cases is never available to remedy potential
miscarriages of justice.
Third, the reluctance of the court in Gardner IV to completely foreclose the
availability of merits review in capital cases undermines Appellee's reliance on "sound
policy" as a basis for doing so. Appellee's Brief at 41. As Appellee sees things, "Adopting
a rule that no procedural bar applies to death-sentenced petitioners will give them the power
to forestall execution indefinitely by withholding claims or relitigating previously lost claims
in endless post-conviction proceedings." Appellee's Brief at 42. Not only is this statement
empirically incorrect, it also is not germane to the procedural posture of this case. The
petitioner in Gardner IV completed his first round of federal review of his conviction and
death sentence on March 8,2010, when the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Tenth
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Circuit's resolution of his habeas appeal. See Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862 (10th Cir.
2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). He was executed a little more than three months
later after this Court was "satisfied that no injustice will result" from not reviewing the merits
of his claims. Gardner IV, 2010 UT 46, \ 96,234 P.3d 1115; but see Tillman v. State, 2005
UT 56,fflj21-23, 128 P.3d 1123 (granting relief on the eve of execution in the interest of
justice to a death-row prisoner). Merits review in Gardner IV would not have led to relief,
whether or not the petitioner was attempting to litigate a new claim or an old claim. It
certainly would not have delayed the execution scheduled by the district court.
Moreover, unlike the petitioner in Gardner IV, Carter is still pursuing his first round

<

of federal habeas relief. Merits review of all of Carter's claims, to the extent that it is
required in order to serve the ends of justice, would be fully consistent with the principles
of federal-state comity, for it results from Carter's choice to give the Utah state courts the
first opportunity to correct their own errors. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,179
(2001). It would not result in any delay of the execution date in this case, because no date
can be set while a federal district court is entertaining a death-row prisoner's first federal
habeas petition. See McFarlandv. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994). In light of the procedural
posture of this case, the gravity of the sentence involved provides equally strong
countervailing policy arguments in favor of merits review of Carter's claims to the extent that
the interests of justice require.
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II.

THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS.
A.

Material issues of disputed fact exist so as to warrant an evidentiary
hearing on Carter's claims regarding the effectiveness of his counsel.

Appellee has admitted that Carter would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing "if he
demonstrated a material issue of disputed fact." Appellee's Brief at 9. Carter has created
multiple issues of disputed fact. However, Appellee appears to assert that Carter can never
make his case because lead trial and lead sentencing counsel are deceased. That some of
prior counsel have passed away before Carter could receive his day in court should not be
held against Carter. Furthermore, plenty of others are available to testify about lead
counsels' actions, including co-counsel. See White v. Roper, 416 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir.
2005) (finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present information
favorable to the defense even though trial counsel died before the hearing was held, second
chair and an investigator did testify). In addition, legal experts could testify about the
reasonableness of counsel's actions in light of minimum standards of competency in capital
cases.2 See, e.g., Houskeeper, 2008 UT 95,112,197 P.3d 636 (Utah 2008) (granting relief
on ineffective assistance of counsel where testimony included that of a legal expert). Finally,
some of counsel's actions - such as the complete failure to investigate and review the State's
file - are so egregious that no strategic reason could support them.

2

During the original post-conviction proceedings, Carter proffered an affidavit and
requested the services of a legal expert, but this request was denied on the basis that the "law
does not provide for reimbursement for civil litigation filed by a defendant." (ROA - Carter
7/7-218,246-47.)
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Appellee faults Carter for not coming forward with evidence from prior counsel3 and
for failing to request discovery in the proceedings below. However, as argued in the
Opening Brief, current counsel should have been allowed more time to re-brief the issues and
investigate this complex case with an exceptionally voluminous record, even for a capital

g

case. Current counsel was able to obtain declarations from several of Carter's prior counsel
after this case had already proceeded to appeal, so they are not in the record below.4 These
declarations illustrate prejudice from the lower court's failure to allow current counsel more
time to investigate and re-brief the issues. It is certainly not Carter's fault that he was
continually assigned attorneys who were not qualified to do capital post-conviction work.

<

Menzies makes it clear that prior post-conviction counsels' failures of constitutional
magnitude cannot be held against Carter. Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ]f 86. In addition, during

3

Appellee asserts that first post-conviction counsel had contact with Mr. Snyder,
resentencing counsel, because they proffered an affidavit from him, yet failed to outline his
proposed testimony. Appellee's Brief at 78. Appellee does not cite to any portion of the
record for this proposition. The only declaration Carter can find in the record from Mr.
Snyder was obtained by the prosecution, not by Carter's first post-conviction counsel. (ROA
-Carter 7/7-459).

{

i

4

Carter was able to obtain declarations that support these claims from Gary Weight,
counsel during the guilt phase and original direct appeal; Michael Esplin, counsel during the
guilt phase; D. John Musselman, counsel at resentencing and on the direct appeal from
resentencing; Kevin Kumurada, counsel on the ACLU amicus brief for the original direct
appeal; Linda Barclay, counsel on direct appeal from resentencing (and a minor role as
counsel during resentencing); Karen Chaney, an attorney who consulted with Mr. Morgan
during post-conviciton; Kent Willis, an attorney who had a limited role at resentencing; Mark
Moffat, an attorney who represented Carter in state post-conviction; and Lynn Donaldson,
an attorney who assisted in the petition for certiorari after the second direct appeal. This case
should be remanded so that Carter can offer these declarations to the district court below.
32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

(

his original post-conviction proceedings, Carter provided factual support for his need for
investigative and expert funding, but this request was denied. (ROA - Carter 111-212,24647,459.)
Although Carter does believe there are deficiencies in prior post-conviction counsel's
work on the case, Carter is not conceding that he cannot establish prejudice on the current
record. On certain issues, there is sufficient information on the current record for this Court
to grant relief, but then Appellee would be unable to counter the proffer of prejudice.
Obviously, this is not the way claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be resolved.
When material issues of fact exist, a hearing should be held.
In addition, part of the problem with the current proffer is due to the fact that state
actors have repeatedly refused to allow appropriate psychological testing of Carter in prison
that could help prove his claims, such as claims regarding sentencing counsel and claims
regarding the confession. A remand would allow the lower court to enter appropriate court
orders that would ensure this evaluation could take place.
B.

Ineffectiveness in regard to the confession.

Carter has brought forth material facts which show that Mr. McNeil wholly failed
Carter in his representation. He did not review readily available discovery and failed to
marshal the substantial evidence in this case which casts doubt upon Carter's guilt.5 Under

5

By arguing the facts regarding McNeil's performance during the preliminary hearing,
his lack of a witness list, and the problems with his opening statement, Carter is not
attempting to add new legal claims, as Appellee has asserted. He is simply making the court
aware of the overall performance of counsel. Ineffectiveness claims must be viewed
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Appellee's twisted view of defense counsel's duties, if an alleged confession exists, defense
counsel has the right to conduct no investigation, or even marshal readily available evidence

*

of reasonable doubt that already exists in the State's own files. Given what we know about
the prevalence of false confessions, especially involving defendants with limited intellectual

|

capacity such as Carter, this is an untenable proposition. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 320-21 n.5 (2002) (citation omitted) (noting the "disturbing" number of death row
exonerees in the last few years, including those who falsely confessed ). In addition, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that counsel's duties of investigation exist "regardless of the
accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt." Rompillav.

{

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (citation omitted).6
In determining whether a suspect's confession violates his due process rights, courts
examine the duration and conditions of detention, the manifest attitude of the police toward
the defendant, the defendant's physical and mental state, and the diverse pressures which sap
or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574

*

(1987), quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961). For a waiver to be found
cumulatively, not in isolation.

i

6

On this point, Appellee has again faulted Carter for not coming forward with
evidence from prior counsel. However, after being allowed time to investigate the case,
current counsel was able to obtain a declaration from prior guilt phase counsel. Guilt phase
counsel has admitted that he believes no investigator was working on the case, that no
investigation was done by McNeil, and that McNeil was unqualified and unaware of the most
basic of Utah procedures. As local counsel, his firm was concerned about McNeil's
"apparent ineptitude." This case should be remanded so that the additional evidence gathered
by current counsel, after the continuance was denied and the case proceeded to appeal, can
be considered in the lower court.
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knowing and intelligent, it must have been made with an understanding of the extent of the
right being given up and the consequences of that decision. If a suspect does not possess the
mental capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then a confession, even a
voluntary one, may be inadmissible. United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991),
citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1985).
Although Carter's confession was upheld on direct appeal, this Court specifically
noted that it did "not sanction the particular manner in which it was recorded in this case."
State v. Carter {Carter 7), 776 P.2d 886, 891 (1989). Additional evidence obtained from
current counsel about the manner in which the confession was recorded raises additional
concerns. See Dkt. 63, Attachment B, Exh. 18. Current counsel for Carter has also obtained
a signed declaration from Ms. Roberson,7 not in the record below, which could have been
obtained by trial counsel and which would have supported Carter's claims that the police
pressured him by their threats to Ms. Roberson. See Carter v. Bigelow, 2:02-cv-00326-TS,
Dkt. 370-2, Exh. B (Dist. Utah Mar. 23, 2011). This same testimony or information could
have been utilized on cross-examination to counter law enforcement's assertions regarding
their treatment of Ms. Roberson and the relationship to Carter's confession. (ROA - Carter
I - 1038 at 759-62); see also Lynumn v. Illinois, 111 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (holding
confession was involuntary where threats were made to take children away from their
mother); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981) (same).

7

In the record, she was referred to as Ms. Robins. Ms. Robins current last name is
Roberson.
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i
Intellectual testing close in time to the confession revealed Carter's IQ to be 75, an
IQ which borders on mental retardation. (ROA 673); American Association of Mental
Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 59
(1 Oth ed. 2002) (noting that the definition of mental retardation includes IQ scores up to 75).

.

Contrary to Appellee's assertion, Carter has brought forth credible psychological evidence
that Carter's cognitive impairments would have made him particularly susceptible to the
coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation. (ROA 1041.)8 Carter has continually
challenged this confession,9 maintained that he is innocent of these crimes, and he has
recently sought DNA testing in state court. See Carter v. State, No. 110402610 (4th Judicial

{

Dist. Ct, Utah Co.). The problems with the confession, when coupled with the new
information regarding the fallibility of the Tovars' testimony, given their dealings with the
I
10

State, creates a reasonable probability of a different result at trial.

See Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,296 (1991) (noting the powerful impact a full confession has upon

8

Appellee faults Dr. Cunningham for not having visited with Carter at the prison.
Current counsel has repeatedly attempted to have Dr. Cunningham approved for a visit with
Carter at the prison. Under resistance never before encountered by current counsel or Dr.
Cunningham, the Utah Department of Corrections has successfully resisted all of Carter's
attempts to conduct an appropriate psychological evaluation. This is yet another reason the
case should be remanded, so that Carter can be allowed to develop evidence in support of his
claims with assistance from the lower court.
9

Appellee has made the strange assertion that Carter's declaration does not challenge
the accuracy of his confession. Appellee's Brief at 88. This argument defies a common
sense reading of Carter's declaration. The declaration clearly states that Carter believed the
confession he signed was a paper related to extradition to Utah. (ROA 822).
10

&>eDkt.63.
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the jury). This is especially true when it is considered that there is absolutely no physical
evidence that links Carter to this crime.
Appellee is simply wrong when he alleges that McNeil, who did no investigation, had
an alleged "strategy" to avoid evidence which could support a claim that Carter's confession
was false due to Carter's intellectual limitations. In fact, McNeil, in his own ineffective way,
attempted to obtain testimony from Detective Pierpont which would insinuate that the
confession he obtained was false because of Carter's intellectual limitations. He asked
Detective Pierpont about Carter's IQ, his level of education (asking him, offensively,
whether he knew if Carter had gone to "some little ghetto school" in Chicago), and his ability
to read and write. (ROA - Carter I - 1038 at 767.) However, Pierpont did not know the
answer to these questions and counsel never produced positive evidence before the jury of
Carter's low IQ, education level, or ability to read or write.
Whether or not law enforcement was or was not aware of Carter' s intellectual capacity
does not destroy this claim. The judge and the jury should have heard expert testimony
regarding Carter's diminished intellectual capacity, which would help explain why he would
confess to a crime he did not commit and illustrate why the language in the confession is so
at odds with the vocabulary of a man with an IQ of 75. Instead, counsel called no experts
and presented no credible evidence of this type at all, allowing the jury to believe the
confession was truthful. See, e.g., Houskeeper, 2008 UT 78,fflf42-43) (granting relief for
ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel, who was also counsel in this case, failed "to
present adequate defense witnesses," including expert witnesses). A showing of prejudice,
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significant enough to justify an evidentiary hearing, was made through the submission of Dr.
Cunningham's report, which directly addresses Carter's confession. (ROA 1041). See Id.,
2008 UT,fflf42-46 (showing of prejudice made because experts not called at hearing did later
testify and testimony supported the petitioner's position). The complete absence of

.

information about how Carter's limited intellectual ability led to his confession skewered
"the entire evidentiary picture." Id at 646; see also Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 111 (4th
Cir. 2011) (finding counsel ineffective in failing to have the confession suppressed); Fisher
v. State, 206 P.3d 607, 612-13 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) (finding ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel "failed to discover and utilize evidence that would have called into

{

question" the defendant's statement and if nothing else, could have lead to a verdict of guilt
on a lesser form of homicide); People v. Cyrus, 48 A.D.3d 150, 160-61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1
i
2007) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to properly pursue a viable
suppression claim and in the failure to raise this same information during the guilt phase,
resulting in only a "lukewarm challenge to its voluntariness before the jury").
C.

*

Ineffectiveness in regard to review of the State's file, investigation, and
failure to raise readily available evidence of reasonable doubt in regard
to forensics and other suspects.

We evaluate an attorney's performance by inquiring into the investigation he
conducted and then asking whether that investigation supports the tactical decisions he made.
"[Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to

i

the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Although "a particular decision not to investigate must be
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directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel's judgments," id. at 691, "[t]he strength of the presumption turns on the
adequacy of counsel's investigation." White v. Roper, 416 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005).
The less counsel investigates, the less a reviewing court should defer to counsel's decisions
based on that curtailed investigation.
From the record, it is clear that McNeil did not investigate his client's case because
there is substantial evidence that he did not review the State's discovery file. n McNeil's
actions are not entitled to the normal deference because of this. At the bare minimum, an
attorney must review the evidence against his client contained in the State's files. Rompilla,
545 U.S. at 387. In this case, the evidence contained in the State's files contained a wealth
of information regarding other suspects,12 and the lack of forensic and other evidence against
Carter, as outlined in the Opening Brief, that could have been used at trial in his favor. See
Fisher, 206 P.3d at 613 (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where "evidence existed
that should have been utilized by defense counsel to hold the prosecution to its burden of
proof and that failure to discover and utilize this evidence rendered trial counsel's
performance deficient."); State v. Gondor, 860 N.E.2d 77, 84 (Ohio 2006) (finding

11

As stated above, current counsel has also obtained a declaration from guilt phase
counsel indicating that no investigation was conducted by McNeil.
12

Appellee is simply incorrect that Carter has not sought testing on Cox's clothing.
Appellee's Brief at 102 n.47. Carter is currently seeking that testing. See Carter v. State,
No. 110402610 (4th Judicial Dist. Ct, Utah Co.).
39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to presented evidence that others may
have been involved in the murder).

'

Appellee's pleading illustrates that there is a genuine issue of material of fact as to
whether McNeil ever looked at the evidence contained in the State's file, much of which
could have been used to Carter's advantage during trial. Such a failure would clearly be
grounds for a finding of deficient performance. See, e.g., State v. Gondor, 860 N.E.2d 77,
386-87 (Ohio 2006) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel because the attorneys "failed
to properly examine the prosecutor's file and present evidence in it to the jury); Casey v.
Frank, 346 F.Supp.2d 1000, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (finding ineffective assistance of

\

counsel for failure to investigate where counsel failed to request prior attorney's casefilethat
contained favorable defense information). Thefilewas readily available and reviewing the
i
State's file is among the most basic of functions a defense attorney is expected to perform.
In Rompilla, under the strict standards for federal habeas review, the United States
Supreme Court found defense counsel ineffective for failing to review the prosecution's

files

*

on the defendant's prior conviction. The Court described defense counsel's duty "to obtain
information that the State has and will use against the defendant," as "a matter of common
i
sense." Rompilla, 445 U.S. at 387. In addition, professional guidelines have long held that
"[t]he investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of
the prosecution and law enforcement authorities." Id. (citation omitted). Counsel's failure
to review the file was especially egregious considering that "the file is sitting in the trial
courthouse, open for the asking." Id. at 3 89.
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In Rompilla, the Court found prejudice because the prosecution's file contained
several leads on mitigating evidence. Id. at 390. Here, the prosecution's file contained a
wealth of evidence and leads that could have been used to raise reasonable doubt about
Carter's guilt. No possible strategy could protect counsel's failure to review this file. See
United States v. Thompson, 561 F.Supp.2d 938, 963 (N.D. 111. 2008) ("A 'strategic' choice
made in the blind is no strategy at all; it is no better than throwing darts at a board while
blindfolded."); Espinal v. Bennett, 588 F.Supp.2d 388, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel in part due to counsel's failure to properly utilize the police
reports and noting that "[a]n existing trial strategy, even if initially reasonably, cannot excuse
counsel's failure to investigate new evidence that could potentially exonerate his client or
create reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury.").
Appellee has gone to great lengths to dispute the problems with the ballistics evidence
that both post-conviction and trial counsel could have raised but did not. Appellee's Brief
at 124-127. Appellee's briefing only illustrates that a genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding the ballistics testing that should be subjected to the discovery processes and if
necessary, an evidentiary hearing. {See ROA 465-466).
D.

Ineffectiveness in regard to jury selection.

Carter is not alleging that guilt phase counsel should have been aware of the issues
regarding blood atonement and the mark of Cain because of the resentencing voir dire.
Carter is alleging that his counsel, who was from Chicago, should have consulted with his
local counsel or educated himself about the possible make-up of the jury he was appearing
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before in 1985. See Walker v. State, 195 S.W.3d 250,257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (counsel
was ineffective for failing to question the jurors on their potential biases that could have

*

formed the basis of a challenge for cause). Current counsel has obtained information from
jurors indicating that this line of inquiry would have revealed biases related to Carter's race
and the concept of blood atonement. Dkt. 63, Attachment B, Exh. 14.13
E.

Ineffectiveness in regard to the cross-examination of the Tovars.

Below, Carter alleged that McNeil "failed to cross-examine witnesses on issues
critical to their own credibility." (ROA 475.) He also alleged that McNeil "[hjaving blindly
stumbled onto evidence which suggested that Epifanio Tovar had been given some offer of

|

favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony," should have requested an instruction
regarding the reliability of informant testimony. (ROA 470.) We now know that there were
very fruitful areas to explore regarding Epifanio and Lucia Tovar's credibility and
motivations for testifying, including payments and gifts the State gave them for their
involvement in the case. Dkt. 63; see, e.g., Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir.
2006) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failing "to challenge the credibility of the
prosecutions' key witness" and noting several other cases which have found the same). This
case is similar in this respect to Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2006).

13

The other juror declaration is not in the record below or on appeal. Counsel requests
a remand so that the additional information obtained by current counsel could be examined
by the lower court. The fact that a substantial amount of additional information has been
obtained by current counsel illustrates prejudice from the lower's court's failure to allow
additional time for investigation and re-briefing.
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In Reynoso, the defendant was convicted of murder based upon eyewitness testimony
and the testimony of two witnesses who claimed Reynoso confessed to them. Although
defense counsel questioned some of these witnesses about reward money they received for
coming forward, defense counsel completely failed to inquire about reward money in regard
to two witnesses who were paid $7500 by the State. Id. at 1105-07. This was important
information for purposes of impeachment and demonstrating bias. Although it was unclear
whether trial counsel knew about the reward in regard to these two witnesses, relief was still
granted because these witnesses, like the Tovars, were "crucial to the State's case." Id. at
1113. The information regarding the payment and gifts the Tovars received "would have
provided the jury with a reason why the witnesses may have had a motive to lie." Id.
McNeil had no reason not to aggressively pursue this line of inquiry because it was not
inconsistent with the defense of reasonable doubt, which is the only discernable defense
theory that was put forth. See id.; see also McGahee v. U.S., 570 F.Supp.2d 723, 735 (E.D.
Pa. 2008) ("where an attorney fails to investigate a lead that might provide help for the
defense actually employed at trial, the decision deserves greater scrutiny."). McNeil's
inadequate investigation into the Tovars' bias was prejudicial because the State's case was
not strong, based almost entirely on the testimony of the Tovars and the flawed confession
which also could have been aggressively challenged. There was no physical evidence trying
Carter to the murder. See, e.g., id. at 1116 (state's case was weak where there were no
physical evidence against the defendant and the alleged confessions were recounted by those
who received a reward).
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F.

The violation of the Confrontation Clause by use of the translator, and the
related ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.

Carter has already acknowledged that more factual development is required in order
to show prejudice from these claims. However, the recently discovered evidence about the
Tovars5 and their undisclosed dealings with the State prior to trial, Dkt. 63, illustrate that the
use of the translator may have inhibited McNeil's ability to discover this information, as
McNeil himself stated that his ability to cross-examine Epifanio was hindered by the

*

presence of the translator. (ROA - Carter I - 1038 at 710-711.) Carter should not be
prevented from pursuing these claims due to the ineffectiveness and inaction ofprior counsel.
Factual development is required to prove these claims. For example, in Concepcion v. State,
903 So.2d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), after the petitioner was allowed to put on expert
testimony at an evidentiary hearing, his conviction was reversed because trial counsel was

<

ineffective in failing to challenge the mistranslation of the testimony of the key witness
against him.
G.

Ineffectiveness in regard to the bill of particulars.

Carter stands upon the arguments made in his Opening brief. Again, ineffectiveness
claims are cumulative and require discovery and factual development in order to be fully
proven. However, these types of claims do have merit. See Henderson v. Hames, 697 S.E.2d
798, 804 (Ga. 2010) (counsel ineffective for failing to challenge an indictment that did not
allege an essential element of the crime and for failing to challenge the sufficiency of
evidence for that same reason).
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H.

Ineffectiveness in regard to jury instructions and the merits of the
underlying jury instruction claims.

With regard to instruction No. 1 A, it contained additional erroneous and misleading
language not contained in the language in Tillman, 750 P.2d at 562-63, that created a real
danger of a nonunanimous verdict. The Tillman instruction did not include the language of
the Carter instruction which states that capital murder was complete "under any or all of the
following circumstances." (ROA - Carter I -138.) It further instructed that proof was only
required "to your satisfaction/' which tends to support the idea of an individual finding, as
opposed to unanimity. Id. In Tillman, the Court held that "an instruction on jury unanimity
as to the alternative method found is preferable because it eliminates potential problems
which may arise when one of the alternatives is not supported by substantial evidence."
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 568. Carter relies upon these same arguments in support of the standalone claim regarding this jury instruction.
Appellee argues that counsel could not have been ineffective because Tillman was not
decided until 1987, so counsel had no precedent on which to base an objection. However,
Tillman was not the basis of the objection -jury unanimity was. See Morrisette v. Warden
of the Sussex I State Prison, 613 S.E.2d 551 (Va. 2005) (finding counsel ineffective for
failing to object to a verdict form that did not comport with the established law). On appeal,
Tillman's counsel was able to make this objection without the benefit of Utah precedent. In
fact, Tillman and Carter were most likely tried around the same time. Carter's counsel could
have raised this claim just as easily as Tillman's counsel did and in fact, Carter had more
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reason to object due to the additional language in his instruction which runs counter to the
concept of unanimity.

*

Carter stands on the Opening Brief in regard to the other jury instructions and related
ineffectiveness claims.
I.

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Because the claim is meritorious and implicates fundamental fairness, review should
not be disallowed as procedurally barred. Carter points the Court to the claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel that should have been, but were not, fully investigated, raised, and
supported in an effective and comprehensive manner by direct appeal counsel. See Opening

<

Brief at 43-61. Carter has emphasized the failure of trial counsel to fulfill the most basic of
trial counsel duties, reviewing discovery. Carter has faulted direct appeal counsel for failure
to support claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised on appeal with the readily
available information that was apparent in discovery.
As an example, Carter points specifically to the failure of direct appeal counsel "to

{

investigate or challenge the prosecutor's suppression of evidence" where that claim was
"obvious from the record." Opening Brief at 66. The prosecution's improper reliance on the
<

purported "open file policy" of his office as a means of avoiding the duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence was, Carter argues, clear on the record. Opening Brief at 66-67. He
further directs the Court's attention to the 1992 resentencing proceedings where evidence
was developed establishing that the prosecution had suppressed evidence, namely the
conditional grant of immunity that the prosecutor had given Anne Carter. Opening Brief at
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67.14 Carter also discusses how, in addressing the ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim that
was presented on direct appeal, the Court made reference to a standard that has subsequently
been disavowed as inappropriate. Opening Brief at 65, n. 18.
Appellee addresses the claim in primarily in Section IV.F. of his brief. Appellee
argues that this Court has "essentially rejected" the underlying claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel in Carter's first PCR appeal. Appellee's Brief at 130-31. Appellee opines
that the Court used the correct standard in doing so (Appellee's Brief at 129) and that "Carter
misstates the deficient performance standard." Id. Carter disagrees.
In addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel as it related
to failure to adequately address and raise the suppression of exculpatory evidence, the Court
stated "our review of the record reveals that this 'evidence' has been in the State's files and
available to Carter-through the State's open-file policy-since 1985." State v. Carter, 888
P.2d 629,640 (1995). That reference, however, was directed only to evidence regarding the
lack of fingerprints or African-American hair samples connecting Carter to the crime scene.
It had nothing to do with the suppression of the conditional grant of immunity to Anne

Carter has recently uncovered other exculpatory and impeachment evidence that has
been suppressed by the prosecution regarding favorable treatment - relocation to one or more
apartments, payment of rent, payment of utilities, cash, gifts, and a Christmas tree - provided
to Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, critical witnesses in Carter's trial and resentencing. See Dkt.
63. A motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), based on newly discovered evidence concerning the
favorable treatment of the Tovars, seeking to reopen the underlying post-conviction
proceeding and to set aside the judgement being appealed herein, is pending before the
Fourth Judicial District Court. Counsel for Carter have been informed by the district court
that oral argument on this is will be set in December, 2011.
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Carter. In fact, the Court alluded to the possibility that the immunity letter was never
included in the State's' s file by the prosecuting attorney at the first trial, Wayne Watson. See
Carter II, 888 at 640, n. 14.
Despite the Court's finding with respect to the availability of evidence regarding the

.

lack of fingerprints or African-American hair evidence connecting Carter to the scene, no one
can be sure what was or was not contained in the State's files.15 There is nothing in the
record to suggest that trial counsel ever reviewed those files. What is clear in the record,
however, is the prosecution avowed that all exculpatory evidence was included in police
reports made available to Carter during his trial proceedings. Carter II, 888 P.2d at 636-37.
That was not the case. At the very least, the record reflects that the immunity letter to Anne
Carter, impeachment evidence that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose, was not included
in the police reports made available to defense counsel.16
Appellee concedes that it is beyond debate that the prosecution has an absolute duty
to disclose all exculpatory evidence. Appellee's Brief at 130. Appellee argues, however,
that Carter could not have succeeded in gaining relief because he cannot show that appellate
counsel overlooked a Brady claim that was obvious on the record. He then seeks to excuse
the prosecution's failure to disclose the conditional grant of immunity based on the "open
15

Carter does not concede that any specific exculpatory evidence was in the State's
files and available to Carter.
16

In his Rule 60(b) motion before the Fourth Judicial District Court, Carter has averred
that evidence concerning the favorable treatment of the Tovars was not included in the police
reports provided to any of Carter's counsel. See Dkt. 63 at 32; Dkt. 63, Attachment B,
Exhibit 1 at If 4, Exhibit 2 at If 4, Exhibit 11 at If 10, and Exhibit 12 at If 3.
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(

file" policy of the prosecution and the fact that the immunity agreement, by itself, could not
support a Brady claim. Appellee's Brief at 130-31. Appellee inexplicably claims that Carter
has not shown that any favorable evidence was withheld. In doing so, he fails to address how
the immunity agreement would not constitute favorable impeachment evidence.
Carter's position remains that the prosecution at each trial had a duty to discover and
disclose all exculpatory and impeachment evidence and that lack of knowledge on the part
of a prosecutor does not excuse the failure to do so. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (duty to disclose irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution); Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case).
Appellee suggests that the failure to disclose the immunity agreement during the 1992
resentencing proceedings should be excused because it was not discovered until 1992.
Although Carter does not concede that the prosecution was not aware of the immunity
agreement until 1992, even if that were true it would not excuse the duty of the prosecution
to search for and disclose all exculpatory evidence at each and every stage of the
proceedings.
Appellee further opines that U.S. Supreme Court precedent does not establish that an
open-file policy cannot excuse the failure to disclose Brady material. Appellee's Brief at
131, n. 66. While Appellee is correct in Kyles the Court noted it had never established a
constitutional requirement for an open file policy {see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437), his inference
that the open file policy should excuse the failure to disclose is in error. See Banks v Dretke,
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I
540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (holding that a rule declaring "prosecutor may hide, defendant
must seek," is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due
process). Appellee's attempt to justify the failure to disclose the immunity agreement cannot
stand scrutiny.

d

Finally, Appellee argues that, even if Carter can establish that the prosecution
withheld evidence from trial counsel, he cannot show that the suppressed evidence would
have overcome his "unrefuted admissions to police and the Tovars. Appellee's Brief at 132.
Carter submits that a remand is necessary to determine, after factual development is
completed, if the suppressed evidence, when considered cumulatively, is in fact material.
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (following the established rule that the State's obligation under
Brady turns on the cumulative effect of all such evidence suppressed by the government).
While we know that some favorable evidence was suppressed because the immunity
document was never disclosed, it is not possible to determine the cumulative effect of the
suppressed evidence on the entire trial until it is finally determined what other evidence was
or was not suppressed.17

17

Ultimately the analysis would require considering both the immunity document and
any other evidence found to have been suppressed, including the evidence Carter has
developed regarding the favorable treatment of the Tovars. See Dkt. 63. It is important to
note that Carter has also alleged in his Rule 60(b) motion that the prosecution knowingly
presented, and failed to correct, the false or perjured testimony of Epifanio Tovar regarding
the issue of whether he and his family ever received favorable treatment or benefits in
exchange for their testimony in Cartel's case. See Dkt. 63 at 3-4, 23, 36-39; Dkt. 63,
Attachment B, Exhibit 5,ffif3, 5.
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To the extent Appellee's position is that the suppression of evidence in this case is
harmless because Carter cannot "overcome his unrefuted admissions to police and the
Tovars" to show that he would have been acquitted, his position is legally unsupportable.
In Kyles, the Court discussed important aspects of the materiality analysis in Brady cases,
including:
1.

A showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have
resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal;

2.

Materiality is not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of
the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to
convict; and

3.

Once a reviewing court has found constitutional error there is no need
for further harmless-error review.

Kyles, 514 U.S. 434-35. Appellee argues that Carter would have been convicted, even had
he had access to the exculpatory evidence, because his admission to the police and to the
Tovars remains unrefuted. That is not the standard in Brady cases. The question is whether,
considered cumulatively, "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at
435.
Trial counsel was never "given" any police reports by the prosecution. While it may
be that trial counsel failed to pursue those reports personally, that does not excuse the
prosecution from it's duty to affirmatively provide to Carter the favorable, exculpatory
evidence in the prosecution's actual or implied possession. The prosecution in this case
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insisted it could play "hide and seek" with the exculpatory evidence. The prosecution
refused to provide discovery to trial counsel, arguing that he had no "duty to spread my case
before him and say you may want to look at this and you may want to look at that." (ROACarter 11241 at 858.) At the same time, the prosecution affirmatively avowed that all
exculpatory evidence had been provided in the police reports, a clearly false representation.
That the prosecution was not acting in conformance with his duties regarding the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence was readily apparent on the record. All reviewing
counsel had a duty to raise this meritorious issue. Considering the significant exculpatory
evidence that was not provided to trial counsel - including but not limited to forensic
evidence that either did not place Carter at the crime scene or was inconsistent with the
prosecutions theory of the case, evidence of other suspects, and significant impeachment
evidence such as the immunity letter18 - it is clear that the cumulative effect of this evidence
outs the case in an entirely different light. Had the jury heard evidence regarding the other
viable suspects, the forensic findings at the crime scene, the impeachment evidence of
testimony of a key witness provided only after receiving immunity, it would have certainly
given them pause as to their decisions. Under such circumstances, the courts cannot rely on
the verdict of the jury and the subsequent sentence of death is clearly suspect.19

18

The existence of the exculpatory evidence regarding benefits provided to the Tovars
is also a critical aspect of the Brady violations in this case.
19

Some of the jurors in this case have indicated the importance of impeachment
evidence. See Dkt. 63, Attachment B, Exhs. 13-16.
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The claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise, inter alia,
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel who failed to review discovery, failed to adequately
pursue and obtain exculpatory evidence, and failed to develop and present a meaningful
defense that at least took into consideration the exculpatory evidence is clearly a meritorious
claim for relief. The prosecution's failure to comply with its duty of disclosure has
contributed to the failure of prior counsel to fully and comprehensively present these claims
for review. For all the reasons set forth herein, and in Carter's Opening Brief, these claims
should be considered and relief granted. In the alternative, the case should be remanded for
further factual development and consideration on the merits.
J.

Ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel.

In Claim V of his 2006 petition for post-conviction relief, Carter raised a claim that
his counsel at his 1992 resentencing proceedings provided ineffective assistance of counsel
in the investigation and development of mitigation evidence on Carter's behalf. (ROA 6658.) In his petition, Carter provided a summary listing of examples of the available
mitigation that was readily available but never investigated and developed by resentencing
counsel. (ROA 65-59). In his Memorandum In Opposition to State's Motion To Dismiss
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (ROA 529-331), Carter again discussed the claim of
ineffective assistance of his resentencing counsel (ROA 402-377), providing another listing
of examples of readily available mitigation evidence not investigated or developed by his
counsel. (ROA 401-392). In support of his claims for relief and his motion in opposition
to dismissal, Carter attached and proffered numerous documents including affidavits from
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various family members and friends and reports from various mitigation and mental health
experts.20 (ROA 693-682, 667-656, 1048-993, 1267-1129, 1694-1665). Carter also
addressed the proffered supporting documents and provided summaries of their contents in
his Opening Brief. Opening Brief at 69, 78-87.
In Section III of his Opening Brief, Carter addressed the merits of the claim of
ineffective representation by his 1992 resentencing counsel.21 Opening Brief at 72-89. Carter
has explained how various circumstances such as the conflicts between sentencing counsel,
concerns over inadequate funding, lack of investigative resources, the lack of a mitigation
specialist, and the lack of an independent and conflict free mental health professional
combine to create an environment that insured the deficient investigation and development
of the available mitigation evidence that could have, and should have, been presented as a
case for life for Carter.
Appellee argues that Carter has failed to establish a meritorious challenge to the
adequacy of resentencing counsel's efforts at investigating and developing mitigation
evidence. Appellee's Brief, Section IV.H, at 133-162. At the core of Appellee's arguments
is the fact that resentencing counsel did present some mitigation on Carter's behalf. Indeed,
resentencing counsel presented the testimony of Carter's mother, his brother, his sister
20

An index of the exhibits attached to the Memorandum can be found at ROA 329-

323.
21

In Sections II A-E of his Opening Brief, Carter argues that his claim that
resentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance, as well as all other claims that the court
dismissed as being previously raised and rejected and procedurally barred, should be
addressed by the court. Opening Brief at 31-65.
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Jacqueline Stover, and psychologist Robert Howell. A close review of their testimony,
especially when compared to the mitigation evidence Carter has proffered, reveals the
inadequacy of resentencing counsel's efforts. The comparison is not done as an exercise in
hindsight, but rather as a means ofpointing out the obvious failures of resentencing counsel's
investigative efforts and how the investigative inadequacies lead to the presentation of an
ineffective mitigation case that did not provide a significant opportunity for the jury or the
court to meaningfully balance the competing cases of aggravation and mitigation.
Carter has previously discussed, in detail, the proffered evidence that could have been
discovered had counsel performed a constitutionally adequate mitigation investigation.
Opening Brief at 79-86,135-142. {See, e.g., ROA 66-59.) He has also proffered supporting
documentation that sets forth the readily available mitigation evidence that was not
discovered by resentencing counsel because he did not perform an adequate mitigation
investigation. The proffered evidence included reports from an experienced mitigation
specialist, Janet Dowling (ROA 1267-1214), and two experienced Forensic Psychologists,
Mark Cunningham (ROA 1048-993), and Vickie Gregory.22 (ROA 1694-1667.) These
reports provide in depth discussions of relevant mitigation evidence in Carter's history,
including: 1) the psycho-social history of Carter and his family, 2) the Carter family
dynamics, 3) Carter's exposure to multiple risk factors and deficits including exposure to
violence, physical and emotional trauma, sexual abuse and trauma, drug and alcohol

22

Dr. Gregory specializes in forensic neuropsychology and is also an attorney and a
member of the Utah Bar.
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addiction on the part of Carter and other family members, 4) compromised neurological
development and functioning, 5) learning disabilities and cognitive deficits, 6) abandonment,
7) poverty, and 8) racism. Additionally, the reports provide insight into how these factors
affected Carter's development, behavior, and judgment. The reports also indicate that,
despite all he has gone through, Carter is likely to do well in a prison setting if given a life
sentence. These constitute the type of mitigating factors that are critical to jury decisions on
moral culpability and the appropriate sentence in capital cases. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 535 (2003) (noting the defendant had "the kind of troubled history we have
declared relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability.") The reports of Dowling,
Gregory, and Cunningham are well reasoned and compelling, precisely the type of mitigation
evidence that should have been presented on Carter's behalf. Any competent death penalty
counsel would have done so, or would have at least conducted a comprehensive mitigation
investigation before making a decision not to do so. That was not done in this case.
In his Opening Brief Carter argued that "[t]he additional mitigation that has since been
uncovered paints a completely different picture than that presented at sentencing." Opening
Brief at 79. The picture painted by resentencing counsel was that Carter grew up in decent
urban neighborhoods with a close-knit and caring family, while presenting little to no
discussion of family functioning, substance abuse, poverty, and the other relevant factors.
To the extent these issues were discussed, the negative aspects were often minimized.
Counsel offered no explanation as to how or why Carter came to be in a situation where he
was being charged with capital murder. Counsel offered little to no evidence designed to
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humanize Carter to the jury or to establish a level of moral culpability that might convince
a jury or judge that a sentence of less than death would be appropriate.
Appellee apparently agrees that the picture painted by Carter's proffered evidence
paints a completely different picture than that painted by the evidence presented at the 1992
resentencing proceedings, Appellee describes the proffered evidence as follows: "The
affidavits and reports presented [ ] now portray Carter's 'close' family as wholly
dysfunctional, filled with alcohol and drug abuse, domestic arguments, violence and
poverty." Appellee Brief at 142. Appellee goes on to acknowledge, correctly, that the
proffered evidence addresses issues such as Carter's extensive drug use from the age of
twelve; complicity of his brother in drinking, drug use, and gang affiliation and activities;
heavy drinking by Carter's mother; and Carter's having been raised in neighborhoods "ruled
by gangs, overrun with drug use and violence, and filed with despair." Telling a story like
this through the introduction of evidence is the very essence of an effective mitigation case
that serves to explain and humanize the defendant and to justify a sentence less than death.
Appellee has not taken the position that the proffered evidence is not credible. Nor
has he argued that it should not be considered by this Court. Instead he argues that it is
improper to assume that the proffered evidence presents the truth about Carter's background
because the family provided different testimony at the resentencing. Appellee's Brief at 14647. The fact that the families provided inconsistent information at resentencing does not
establish that sentencing counsel performed effectively in investigating and presenting the
mitigation in this case. It is very difficult for individuals to admit to things like ineffective
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parenting, drug and alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, physical abuse, family dysfunction and
other private information that they find shameful and embarrassing. See Craig M. Cooley,
Mapping the Monster's Mental Health and Social History: Why Capital Defense Attorneys
and Public Defender Death Penalty Units Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 23, 57-58 (2005); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 360-61
(1995). Developing rapport and trust with the family members takes a considerable amount
of time and energy. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13
Akron L. Rev. 331, 331-32 (1979). This is one of the most compelling justifications for
using a mitigation specialist who is trained in the skills necessary to allow people to feel
comfortable in providing such painful and embarrassing information.
Dr. Howell recognized the need to spend the time to develop a trusting relationship
in seeking to gather this type of information. He interviewed Carter on eight separate days
over the course of a month. He opined that it was necessary to do this so that Carter could
get to know him and cooperate with him. (ROA 1705.) Dr. Howell did not indicate, in his
report or his testimony, that he spent any such efforts in developing a relationship with the
family members he interviewed. It is not surprising that over the years, some of the family
may have begun to feel more comfortable and to open up about some of these issues as they
continued to be interviewed.
In an attempt to establish that resentencing counsel presented an adequate mitigation
case, Appellee sets forth a summary of the mitigation evidence presented in 1992. Citing the
58
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testimony of Carter's mother, brother, one sister, and Dr. Howell. (ROA Carter II2362 at
1144-1248), Appellee lists, witness by witness, the evidence presented at the 1992
proceedings. Putting the evidence set forth by Appellee in his brief in a narrative format, one
can see the true scope and deficiencies of the mitigation case for life that was presented on
Carter's behalf:
Carter was the youngest of seven children in a family from Chicago.
The family was close and sociable, living in a nice, predominantly black
neighborhood on Chicago's south side. The neighborhood was very stable,
tough but close-knit. There were block parties and the families played a lot of
different sports. The sports often took place at the Carter home.
The Carter family structure was not stable. Carter's mother divorced
his father when Carter was a toddler. For years there was no father figure in
the home. He had only one older brother. Carter's mother did not marry
Carter's step-father until Carter was fourteen years old. While Carter got
along with his step-father, problems existed as the step-father was an
alcoholic.
Carter was a well behaved, shy and withdrawn child. He got along with
his siblings. He enjoyed dancing, playing music, playing ball, and acting in
plays written by one of his sisters for the neighborhood children to perform.
Carter was very quiet when he first started school. He got average grades and
was almost never in fights. He was not hot-headed and was not prone to
violence.
Carter experienced at least one fall as a child that resulted in
unconsciousness. This occurred sometime during his childhood, after age
seven but before age fifteen, but his exact age at the time of the fall is
unknown.23 Carter suffered from regular headaches of varying intensity after
the fall. Carter believed he did well in school before the fall.
All Carter's siblings completed high school. Two of his siblings had
advanced degrees, another attended some college, and most had solid, steady
employment. Carter, on the other hand, did not finish high school. He

23

Appellee does not discuss the portion of the testimony of Carter's brother Brad
during which he recalled the event occurring when Carter was between seven and ten years
old. (ROA Carter II2363 at 1205). Dr. Howell also testified as to what he was told about
the age of Carter when the fall occurred. (ROA Carter II2363 at 1236-1237.)
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dropped out in the tenth or eleventh grade. Carter found school boring and
started hanging out with friends rather than attending school. It was around
this time that Carter began having trouble with the law, although he was never
arrested as a juvenile.
When Carter was in his middle teens, the family moved from the nice,
predominantly black neighborhood on Chicago's south side to a predominantly
white neighborhood. Problems continued in the new neighborhood. Carter
and his siblings experienced acts of racism and hatred. Carter was spat on and
chased by white children. Carter, his brother, and two friends were attacked
and one of the friends was severely beaten with baseball bats. Carter and his
siblings attended schools outside of the new neighborhood to avoid gangs. A
close friend of Carter died violently during this time period. This was a source
of great pain for Carter and his family. As a result of the negative experiences
in the new neighborhood, Carter and his brother would travel the twenty
blocks to the old neighborhood for any outside activity. Carter eventually
elected to move back and lived with his grandmother in the old neighborhood.
The Carter family eventually moved to Provo, Utah. According to one
of Carter's sister's, she favored the move to Utah because the old
neighborhood presented problems with gang members and Carter had been
attacked. Carter experienced more racism and unkind acts in Utah. Carter
had a difficult time understanding the racial hatred he experienced. In Utah,
Carter had a relationship with a Caucasian woman. Carter's brother felt that
Anne was manipulative in her pursuit of Carter. Nevertheless, Carter
eventually married Anne. They both experienced additional racist remarks as
a result of their interracial relationship. Anne's parents disapproved of the
interracial marriage. Anne Carter bore a child by Carter but elected to give the
child up for adoption at her parents insistence. This caused Carter great pain.
Once he was arrested, Carter kept in contact with his mother. He sent
her cards on Mother's day and wrote poetry. After she moved back to
Chicago, Carter and she spoke about twice a month. According to Carter's
mother, Carter read a lot in prison and was learning a lot. One of Carter's
sisters indicated that she thought Carter's writing and speech had improved
while he was in prison. Both his mother and his sister loved Carter and did not
want him to die.
See Appellee Brief at 133-141. {See also ROA Carter 7/2362 at 1141 - 1200;ROA Carter
7/2363 at 1201-1248.)
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Appellee's summary of the mitigation narrative provided to the jury in 1992 is, for the
most part, an accurate reflection of what was presented at the 1992 resentencing. In addition
to the information presented through the three family members, resentencing counsel also
presented the testimony of a psychologist, Robert Howell. (ROA Carter II2363 at 12091248.) The entire mitigation case took only 107 pages, including arguments, conferences
with the court, and cross examinations by the State. It resulted in a simplistic verbal picture
of the family background and history of Carter provided by three family members and one
psychologist who testified at the resentencing. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it provided
minimal detail, minimized the difficulties of Carter's developmental years, left numerous
gaps and concerns that are ignored and unexplained, and provided no meaningful information
that would be compelling and invoke the sympathy of a jury in a capital case. Appellee
argues that, nonetheless, the mitigation evidence presented was constitutionally adequate.
What is apparent from the record, contrary to Appellee's position, is that the
mitigation that was presented was not developed based upon a comprehensive mitigation
investigation such as is required in capital cases. See, generally, Porter v. McCollum, 548
U.S.

,

, 130 S.Ct.447,453 (2009) (per curiam) (finding counsel performed deficiently

where he "ignored pertinent avenues for investigation of which he should have been aware"
and holding the decision not to investigate further "did not reflect reasonable professional
judgment"); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (citing with approval the ABA Guidelines which
provide that investigations into mitigating evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all
reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that
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may be introduced by the prosecutor."). The case presented leaves so many unanswered
questions, questions that an independent mental health professional, a mitigation specialist,
and competent counsel would recognize as requiring additional investigation.
Appellee's complaint is that no one knows which version of the information provided
by family members is true. If so, this only supports the need for further factual development
and an evidentiary hearing on these issues. Appellee places great reliance on his belief that
resentencing counsel "painted for the jury the picture that Carter and his family painted for
him." Appellee's Brief at 147. Thus, Appellee concludes, "Carter has no basis to complain."
Id. This fails to comport with United State Supreme Court precedent in capital cases. See
Porter, supra, at

, 130 S.Ct. at 453-56 (acknowledging that counsel described Porter as

fatalistic and uncooperative but granting relief based on deficient mitigation investigation).
The duty falls on counsel to fully investigate all avenues of mitigation.
As is evident from the discussion of the proffered mitigation evidence, this is not a
close case. The mitigation presented was deficient and raised more questions than it
answered, it failed to humanize Carter, and it offered nothing by which to gauge his moral
culpability. As the Supreme Court has stated:
This is not a case in which the new evidence "would barely have altered the
sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge." Strickland, supra, at
700,104 S.Ct. 2052. The judge and jury at Porter's original sentencing heard
almost nothing that would humanize Porter or allow them to accurately gauge
his moral culpability. They learned about Porter's turbulent relationship with
Williams, his crimes, and almost nothing else. Had Porter's counsel been
effective, the judge and jury would have learned of the "kind of troubled
history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability."
Wiggins, supra, at 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527. They would have heard about (1)
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Porter's heroic military service in two of the most critical-and horrific-battles
of the Korean War, (2) his struggles to regain normality upon his return from
war, (3) his childhood history of physical abuse, and (4) his brain abnormality,
difficulty reading and writing, and limited schooling. See Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) ("'[Evidence
about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that
are attributable to a disadvantaged background ... may be less culpable5 ").
Instead, they heard absolutely none of that evidence, evidence which "might
well have influenced the jury's appraisal of [Porter's] moral culpability."
[Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)].
Porter, supra at

, 130 S.Ct. at 454.

Appellee also places great importance on that fact that this is not a case where counsel
did no mitigation investigation. Counsel put on some mitigation including testimony of a
mental health professional who found that Carter suffered from brain damage and cognitive
deficits.

Thus, Appellee erroneously concludes, Carter cannot establish deficient

performance.
In Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008) the court dealt with a similar
case in that counsel had presented some mitigation evidence. In granting relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded:
In recent years, the Supreme Court and this Court have placed increasing
emphasis on the obligation of defense counsel in capital cases to develop and
present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of the trial, often on the basis
of family upbringing and mental health. This is a closer case than some,
because defense counsel did hire an appropriate expert, provide some
background information, and present some of the expert's findings to the jury.
Cf. Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir.2007) (reversing denial of
habeas relief where defense counsel utterly failed to present mitigating
evidence based on family history and mental health). The Supreme Court,
however, has made clear that the investigation and presentation of some
mitigating evidence is not sufficient to meet the constitutional standard, if
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I
counsel fails to investigate reasonably available sources or neglects to present
mitigating evidence without a strong strategic reason. Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); American Bar
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases 11.8.6 (1989) [hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"]. As we
said in Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1180 (10th Cir.2001): "The
sentencing stage is the most critical phase of a death penalty case. Any
competent counsel knows the importance of thoroughly investigating and
presenting mitigating evidence."
Wilson, 536 V3d at 1014.
In Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S.

, 130 S.Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam), the Supreme

Court granted also relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel even though counsel had
presented some mitigation evidence. In doing so, the Court noted:
We certainly have never held that counsel's effort to present some mitigation
evidence should foreclose an inquiry into whether a facially deficient
mitigation investigation might have prejudiced the defendant. To the contrary,
we have consistently explained that the Strickland inquiry requires precisely
the type of probing and fact-specific analysis that the state trial court failed to
undertake below. In the Williams decision, for instance, we categorically
rejected the type of truncated prejudice inquiry undertaken by the state court
in this case. 529 U.S., at 397-398, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Sears, 561 U.S. at

, 130 S.Ct. at 3266. The Court pointed to its decision in Porter, in

which it stated:
The trial court stated that the record was "largely silent" on "what [evidence]
would have been shown if [additional mitigating evidence] had been sought."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 28B. This is a curious assertion in light of the 22
volumes of evidentiary hearing transcripts and submissions in the record,
which spell out the findings discussed above. It also undermines any
suggestion that the court did, in fact, do the reweighing Justice Scalia believes
it undertook; it is plain the record is not "largely silent."
Id at 1421, n. 12.
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This is the same error that Appellee is making in Carter's case. He erroneously
assumes that there was a valid mitigation strategy merely because some mitigation was
presented by resentencing counsel. He also erroneously posits, despite the pages and pages
of supporting documentation of powerful and compelling mitigation evidence that has been
proffered, that the record is silent as to what evidence would have been developed and
presented had an adequate mitigation investigation been conducted.
Maybe the most important lesson to be taken from the holdings in Porter and Sears
is the recognition and acknowledgment that reviewing courts need to make sure that the
courts below adequately consider the mitigation. This requires that the courts actually
engage with what the defendant's went through. Porter, supra at

,130 S.Ct. at 455

(finding that the state post-conviction court unreasonably discounted the evidence of Porter's
military service and reduced to irrelevance the evidence of Porter's abusive childhood and
holding that doing so reflects a failure to engage with what Porter actually went through); see
also Sears, supra at

,130 S.Ct. at 3266 (granting relief upon concluding that the state

court failed to adequately consider the mitigation evidence and brushing off any argument
that the state court simply discounted the value of the mitigation testimony).
Appellee is asking this court to summarily ignore the proffered mitigation evidence.
He wants the Court to reduce to irrelevance all of the proffered mitigation evidence and to
refuse to engage in carefully examining the forces that shaped Carter as a human being. The
Court should decline to do so. These cases make it clear that prejudice can exist even in the
face of the presentation at trial of some significant mitigation evidence. The Court should
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find that resentencing counsel performed deficiently, to the prejudice of Carter. At the very
least, the Court should remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the
ineffective representation of resentencing counsel.
K.

Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Carter has argued throughout his 2006 post-conviction proceedings that he has never
received effective representation. Included in his challenges was the claim that counsel at
his first post-conviction proceedings provided constitutionally ineffective assistance where
they failed to adequately investigate and develop available mitigation evidence. Carter has
also argued that the ineffectiveness of his post-conviction counsel in this regard excuses his
failure to raise the underlying issues of ineffective assistance of his various trial and appellate
counsel for failing to pursue mitigation.
In denying Carter's second post-conviction petition, the court addressed this issue on
the merits, but summarily denied the claim in a single paragraph which stated:
Petitioner has not supported his claim that post-conviction counsel were
ineffective in failing to perform an adequate mitigation investigation in
relation to the initial post-conviction petition. No attempt was made to
specifically articulate what post-conviction counsel's deficiencies were or how
their alleged failures prejudiced Petitioner. Rather, Petitioner simply makes a
conclusory assertion that post-conviction counsel failed to conduct a proper
mitigation investigation. B ecause Petitioner has not shown that post-conviction
counsel were ineffective in any way with respect to the mitigation
investigation, he has failed to demonstrate that his ineffectiveness claim is
meritorious. Therefore, the interests ofjustice exception to the PCRA's statute
of limitations is unavailable and claim 10(p) is time-barred.
Opening Brief Addenda P-56. (ROA 3486.) As noted in Carter's Opening Brief, the merits
of his claim turn on the merits of the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
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at resentencing for failing to fully investigate and develop the available mitigation evidence.
Opening Brief at 134.
Carter has presented his arguments on that underlying claim in his pleadings below
including his petition and his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. He has
urged this Court to consider those arguments and claims in his Opening Brief and in this
Reply Brief. Carter argued then, and continues to argue now, that post-conviction counsel
failed to investigate and develop available mitigation evidence just as resentencing counsel
did. The conclusion of the post-conviction court that Carter has failed to articulate how his
post-conviction counsel were deficient and how Carter was prejudiced by counsels deficient
performance is simply wrong.
In addition to his ongoing position that this Court erred in recognizing the statutory
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in capital cases, Appellee argues
(Appellee Brief at 177) that Carter has proffered no evidence of what Carter's first postconviction counsel actually did and why. Carter submits that what post-conviction counsel
did is not the correct inquiry. The claim is what counsel did not do, namely conduct a
comprehensive mitigation investigation. It is apparent on the record that if counsel did
conduct a comprehensive mitigation investigation, they did not proffer or use any of their
findings. Moreover, there is no record indicating that the family members were ever
interviewed by post-conviction counsel. Finally, Carter has continuously asked for an
evidentiary hearing. Remanding this case for that purpose would be appropriate. Contrary
to Appellee's position that evidence can no longer be developed because some counsel have
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I
died, Carter submits that further factual development could show, for example, what
witnesses were or were not contacted before counsel on the 2006 petition contacted them.
In addition, as argued above, other witnesses involved in representing Carter could be called
to establish that no mitigation investigation, or at least an inadequate one, was accomplished.
To the extent that Appellee is arguing that post-conviction counsel may have had a
strategic reason for not conducting mitigation investigation, that argument is not supported
by the record. There is nothing in the record that indicating that counsel made a decision to
bypass mitigation altogether. If that is something they did it could not have been a valid
strategy. Decisions in capital cases is only valid if an adequate investigation has been
accomplished before such decision is made. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527( a reviewing court
must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (1984) (holding strategic choices made after thorough
investigation to be virtually unchallengeable but strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation can be challenged). Carter has clearly set forth his claim that postconviction counsel did not conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and that there could
be no valid decision to bypass such an inadequate investigation.
Appellee also argues that Carter has offered no explanation as to why his family
would contradict their sworn testimony at trial regarding Carter's background. Appellee
Brief at 177. Apparently, Appellee is inferring that there can never be any reason to
investigate mitigation in a capital case where some mitigation has been presented including
testimony of some family members. Carter has presented pertinent arguments on this issue
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in the sections in his Opening Brief and in this Reply Brief dealing with his claims that
resentencing counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Carter refers the Court to
those sections. As he has argued, there are numerous reasons that counsel must have a
mitigation specialist on their team and must conduct repeated mitigation interviews with
multiple sources. For example, their memories may be flawed, they not remember details
of certain events until they hear others discussing them, or they may not be initially
comfortable disclosing certain private information about the family or the defendant that
might be embarrassing. More importantly, only three members of Carter's family testified.
There are many more members who apparently were never interviewed and never testified,
some of whom provided declarations that have been proffered in this case. Finally, as is
often the case, resentencing counsel may have simply misunderstood the nature of
mitigation.24
Contrary to what Appellee believes, there were valid reason to pursue the mitigation
investigation during the post-conviction proceedings. As discussed in the context of the
claim of ineffective assistance by resentencing counsel for failing to investigate mitigation,
the evidence that was presented at resentencing left many unanswered questions. For

24

Indeed, the ABA Guidelines indicate that comprehensive guilt-innocence and
mitigation investigations should be conducted at every stage. See, e.g., American Bar
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases 1.1 (2003), cmt. B. 1 (counsel must be prepared to thoroughly reinvestigate the entire
case and to make an independent examination of all ofthe available evidence); American Bar
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases 11.9.3(B) (1989) (post-conviction counsel should consider conducting a full
investigation of the case, relating to both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases).
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example, how could one believe the neighborhoods to be "nice" when the family had to keep
moving to protect themselves from gang violence. Janet Dowling's report (ROA 1267-1214)
was able to shed light on that issue once the mitigation investigation was completed.
Moreover, some issues that were neither discussed nor denied at trial were found to exist.
For example, the subsequent mitigation investigation developed evidence regarding such
issues as the significant drug and alcohol abuse by family members, sexual abuse of Carter,
and severe and ongoing family dysfunction.
This Court should find that first post-conviction counsel provided inadequate
representation by failing to conduct a comprehensive mitigation investigation. In the
alternative, it is requested that this Court remand the case for discovery and an evidentiary
hearing on this claim and to address the merits.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Carter asks that the court reverse the judgment of the
district court dismissing his post-conviction claims as procedurally barred. Carter requests
that current counsel be allowed to rebrief or amend the petition within six months after being
provided access to the prosecution's file. Carter also asks the court to order that the district
court allow discovery or convene an evidentiary hearing with respect to the merits of his
claims, see Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1989), or on whether he can
overcome the procedural bar.
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